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Realism and the Riddle of Style
  Catharine Abell 
1. Introduction
My concern in this paper is what, in Art and Illusion, Gombrich
calls "the riddle of style".[1] This is the problem of why people
at different times and in different cultures have depicted
objects in very different ways. An adequate solution to this
problem will comprise an explanation of why depiction has a
history.
The problem seems intractable because of three common
assumptions about the history of depiction that, while
independently plausible, are inconsistent. First, we assume that
this history is a history of realism. Artists from a wide range of
cultures and ages seem to have shared the common goal of
capturing the visual appearances of the objects they depicted.
Secondly, we assume that depictive styles differ from context
to context in part because of features internal to the contexts
in which they emerged. For example, we tend to think that the
Haida would never have developed the styles of depiction
prevalent in The Netherlands in the seventeenth century.
Robert Davidson's Split Beaver (1975) This is an example of the
Split Style of the Haida people, indigenous to Canada. Used by
permission of Robert Davidson.
Finally, we are loathe to accept the claim that differences of
style necessarily result from differences in technical capacity.
However, these assumptions are in conflict. If artists
throughout history sought to capture the appearances of the
things they depicted and did not differ markedly in their
technical capacities, then surely the pictures each produced
should not depend on features internal to the contexts in which
they emerged and should instead look more alike.
Some attempts to solve the riddle of style reject one of these
three assumptions. Others argue that the three assumptions
are in fact compatible. Below, I discuss a version of each of
these approaches and argue that neither is completely
successful. I argue that the history of style is not, in its
entirety, a history of realism. Nevertheless, this does not solve
the riddle of style, since it simply re-emerges as the riddle of
realism: the problem of why those pictures that do aim to
capture their objects' appearances differ from one another. I
argue that the riddle of realism can be solved because styles
produced with this aim can be appropriate to their contexts by
providing information that is relevant to viewers in those
contexts.
2. Styles and Purposes
Gombrich construes the riddle of style as the problem of why
artists, all of whom claim to copy what they see, have copied
the visible world in very different ways.[2] He assumes,
therefore, that the history of style is a history of realism. He
explains why different attempts at realism should produce
different results despite parity of technical skills by claiming
that depiction involves the use of conventional schemata. It is
a matter of convention what schema is chosen to depict an
object in any given historical and cultural context because such
choices are arbitrary: there is nothing about a schema itself
that constrains what object it can be used to depict. Different
choices of initial schemata result in different ways of depicting
things.
Nevertheless, Gombrich claims that conventional schemata can
be corrected better to match their objects' appearances. While
he denies that the eye is innocent and therefore that objects
have an appearance independent of the beliefs of particular
viewers, he holds that pictures match their objects'
appearances when the pictorial schemata they employ match
the perceptual schemata used to interpret visual experiences of
their objects. Pictures that achieve such a match are realistic.
By correcting their schemata, artists can improve how well
their pictures copy the visible world. Although all may aim to
produce faithful copies of the visible world, however, the
pictures they produce will vary because the different schemata
with which they begin will constrain how their pictures look
even after they have been corrected.
As Dominic Lopes notes, Gombrich's solution to the riddle of
style requires him to deny that particular styles are appropriate
to their historical and cultural contexts. Because he takes the
choice of initial schemata to be arbitrary, he cannot claim that
there is anything about the schemata that are initially chosen
in any given context that makes them appropriate to that
context rather than to any other.[3] Moreover, Lopes argues,
because Gombrich holds that the way in which these schemata
are subsequently corrected depends on our perceptual
schemata, it is perception, rather than historical and cultural
context, that determines which corrections are made.[4]
Lopes rejects Gombrich's solution since it limits the art
historian's and the anthropologist's task to that of cataloguing
stylistic changes and precludes them from explaining why
those changes have occurred. He sets out to provide a
response to the riddle which explains what makes particular
styles appropriate to their contexts of use.[5] He proposes a
'non-matching' perceptual theory of depiction, according to
which different ways of depicting objects capture different
visual aspects of those objects, none of which needs match our
perceptual experience of them. He notes that our ability to
recognise objects is dynamic: we can recognise objects under
circumstances and from viewpoints from which we have never
seen them before. Each set of such circumstances comprises a
recognisable aspect of that object. He claims that pictures
present specifically pictorial recognisable aspects of objects
that need not match any of the aspects under which we have
recognised them before.
Coupled with an account of what styles are, this provides a
solution to the riddle of style. Lopes argues that styles are
individuated by the kinds of aspects they present, which can be
understood in terms of the types of properties they depict their
objects as possessing, as lacking, and as neither possessing
nor lacking. On this understanding, styles can be more or less
appropriate to certain contexts, since the purposes for which
pictures are used in a context will dictate which properties need
to be represented. By looking at the purposes for which
pictures were used in certain historical and cultural contexts,
therefore, we can explain why particular styles were
appropriate to those contexts.
For Lopes, the history of style is a history of realism because
realism is a matter of how well pictures perform the purposes
their viewers expect them to serve. A picture is realistic if it
serves its purpose well, by informing its viewers about just
those properties of its object that they expect it to inform
them about. Realism, on Lopes's construal, is informativeness
in a context of use.[6] Thus, a picture is realistic to the Haida if
it informs them about the anatomical structure of its object
while preserving symmetry, whereas Rembrandt's drawing is
realistic to us because it informs us about how a boat on a
river looks.
Rembrandt, A Canal with a Rowing Boat, pen and ink drawing.
This image is used with the permission of Chatsworth Photo Library.
Any form of reproduction, transmission, performance, display,
rental, lending or storage in any retrieval system without the
written consent of the copyright holders is prohibited.
Robert Davidson's Split Beaver (1975) This is an example of the
Split Style of the Kwakiutl people, indigenous to Canada. Used by
permission of Robert Davidson.
Lopes presents his solution as one which resolves the apparent
tension between the three assumptions that lead to the riddle
of style. He resolves this tension by construing realism as a
measure of the extent to which pictures achieve their intended
purposes. However, this account of realism is implausible.
Some pictures serve their purposes perfectly well, without
thereby being realistic to those for whom they serve them. It
no more likely that the Haida consider split-style pictures
realistic than that European audiences around the turn of the
last century considered cubist pictures realistic. What prevents
these pictures from being realistic is not that they do not serve
their purposes well, but rather that the purposes they serve are
not of the appropriate kind.
The history of style is not, in its entirety, a history of realism.
Gombrich is right to hold that realistic pictures are those that
are successfully intended to convey their objects' visual
appearances, even though he is wrong to think that all pictures
aspire to realism. The difference in their purposes explains why
Rembrandt's drawing is realistic while the split-style drawing is
not. Lopes is therefore right that understanding the various
purposes for which pictures have been used will help explain
why certain styles have been used in particular contexts. His
account provides a partial solution to the riddle of style.
However, the riddle threatens to emerge again in a different
guise, this time as the riddle of realism: the problem of how
different styles can emerge in contexts in all of which pictures
serve the purpose of conveying their objects' appearances.
Lopes himself notes, "Though they differ stylistically, the
Audubon print shares with a painting by Giotto the aim of
replicating a set of properties, defined by the rules of
perspective projection, which record versions of occurrent
visual experience." It is pictures governed by this aim that, to
the extent that they realise it, are realistic. Without appeal to
differences in technical capacity, Lopes cannot explain why
attempts at realism differ, since the purpose they serve is the
same. Moreover, while it may be plausible to claim that the
Audubon print manifests realistic techniques that were not
available to Giotto, it is not plausible to claim that realistic
styles vary only with the technical skills of their makers. In
what follows, I argue that styles can be suited to one among
several contexts in which pictures serve the same purpose
because they are more informative in one of these contexts
than in the others.
3. Informativeness and Relevance
Lopes argues that a style is more realistic the better it serves
its purpose. To serve its purpose well, a picture must inform its
viewers about just those aspects of its object they expect
pictures to provide information about. Because he construes
realism as a matter of how well pictures serve their purposes,
Lopes holds that a picture's realism depends on its
informativeness in its context of use.[7] I have denied that
realism is relative to purpose. Nevertheless, I believe that the
key to solving the riddle of realism lies in the claim that
pictures serve their purposes well if they inform their viewers
about the required aspects of their objects.
While Lopes does not unpack the notion of informativeness,
others do. In particular, Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson argue
that being informative involves making a set of assumptions
manifest or more manifest to an audience.[8] An assumption is
manifest to an individual to the extent that she is capable of
representing it mentally and accepting its representation as
either true or probably true.[9] For example, the assumption
that you are reading this is manifest to you now, as is the
assumption that you did not eat a saucer of mud yesterday,
although the latter is less manifest because you are less likely
actually to entertain it. The assumptions that are manifest to
an individual at any time comprise her cognitive environment.
As Sperber and Wilson note, an individual's cognitive
environment is a function of her physical environment (in a
broad sense encompassing her social environment) and her
cognitive abilities (which depend not just on intelligence, but on
existent assumptions, including memory).[10]
Informing someone about something therefore involves
modifying her cognitive environment. Any piece of information
that the individual does not already possess and can represent
and accept as probably true will effect such a modification.
Nevertheless, some information is more efficient at effecting
such modifications than other information. In particular,
information is more efficient the more relevant it is.
Information is relevant to a person if it is connected with the
assumptions already in her cognitive environment such that she
can use it, together with the latter, as the basis for inferences
that she could not otherwise have made.[11] The more
relevant information is, the more efficient it is at modifying her
cognitive environment, that is, the more assumptions it makes
manifest or more manifest to her. For example, if you believe
both that all swans are white with red beaks and that I saw a
swan yesterday, telling you that the swan had a red beak will
modify your cognitive environment by making your belief that
swans have red beaks more manifest to you. However, it isn't
a very efficient way of modifying your cognitive environment
since it is unlikely to lead you to make many further
inferences. Information about the colour of the swan's beak is
therefore not relevant to you. Contrarily, information that the
swan's feathers were black will be relevant to you, since it will
lead you to infer that not all swans are white.
I have argued that the purpose of realistic pictures is to convey
their objects' appearances.[12] Coupled with Lopes's idea that
pictures serve their purposes better the more informative they
are about those aspects of their objects they are used as
sources of information about, this leads to the claim that
pictures are realistic to the extent that they inform their
viewers about their objects' appearances. A picture that is
more informative about its object's appearance will be more
realistic than one which is less informative about this aspect of
its object. Moreover, because informativeness depends on
relevance, pictures will be more realistic the more relevant the
information they provide about their objects' appearances.
Cognitive environments are properties of individuals: no two
people have identical physical environments or cognitive
abilities. Relevance is therefore relative to the individual.
However, there is a notion of relevance that is relative to a
community. To the extent that the various individuals in a
group have cognitive environments that overlap, they have a
shared cognitive environment.[13] Their shared cognitive
environment includes all the assumptions that are manifest to
each of them and excludes any that are not. The individuals
comprising any given historical and cultural community will
have a shared cognitive environment, since their physical
environments are similar and their cognitive abilities will
overlap. Information is relevant to a community when it is
connected with information already manifest to its members
such that it can be used, together with the latter information,
as the basis for further inferences that could not otherwise
have been made. Different communities will have different
shared cognitive environments, since the cognitive
environments of their individual members will differ.
Consequently, different information is relevant to each
community.
If pictures are more realistic the more relevant the information
they provide about their objects' appearances, how realistic a
picture is to a given community will depend on how relevant
the information it provides about its object's appearance is to
that community. A style can provide information about its
object's appearance that is relevant to one community but is
irrelevant or less relevant to another. Consequently, that style
can be appropriate to one community and less appropriate to
others, even if each community uses pictures to provide
information about their objects' appearances. For example, in a
community in which objects' colours are relatively uniform -
people's hair and skin colours do not differ, the landscape is
uniformly coloured, and so on - information about objects'
colours will not be especially relevant. Contrarily, in a
community in which things exhibit a wide variety of colours
depending on their exact identities, information about objects'
colours will be much more relevant, since it will help members
of that community to identify those objects. A style that
provides accurate information about objects' colours will
therefore be more realistic to the latter community than to the
former.
The information that is relevant to a community depends on
the physical environment and cognitive capacities shared by its
members. Investigating the physical environment and cognitive
abilities shared by the members of a given historical and
cultural community will therefore help to tell us what
information was relevant to that community. For communities
that used pictures as sources of information about their objects'
appearances, such investigation will tell us why certain styles
were realistic to some communities, while different styles were
realistic to others.
4. Conclusion
I have argued that the history of style is not, in its entirety, a
history of realism. Throughout history, pictures have been used
to inform viewers about a wide variety of things other than
their objects' appearances. Investigating the purposes for which
pictures were used in particular historical and cultural contexts
will help us to understand why certain styles were appropriate
to those contexts. Nevertheless, it will not help us to
understand why certain styles were appropriate to just one
among a number of contexts in which pictures were used for a
single purpose. To understand this, we need to know what
cognitive environment was shared by the members of the
relevant community. This will enable us to understand why,
given the purpose for which pictures were used in that
community, a certain style was more informative than another.
In addition to cataloguing stylistic changes, therefore, the
historian of art has two further tasks: to investigate both the
various purposes for which pictures have been used and the
cognitive environments of those who used them.
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